Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1986

Celia Sherwood Tipton v. Monte Dee Tipton :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Peter W. Guyon; Guyon & Hunter; attorneys for appellant.
Richard B McKeown; Parker, McKeown & McConkie; attorneys for respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Tipton v. Tipton, No. 860205 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/88

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BRIi-F
KFU
50
.A10
<£bO
DOCKET NO.

-2QS-GA

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CELIA SHERWOOD TIPTON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
(Appeal)

v.
MONTE DEE TIPTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court No. 86-0275

C 3^30^1

\2 \Q

Plaintiff-Respondent herewith submits the following brief in
opposition to the pending appeal to the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah from orders entered by the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding.

Peter W. Guyon of
GUYON & HUNTER
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
1000 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-5555

Richard B. McKeown of
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
505 East 200 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 363-5511

JAN
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CELIA SHERWOOD TIPTON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

MONTE DEE TIPTON,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
(Appeal)
Supreme Court No. 86-0275

Defendant-Appellant.

Plaintiff-Respondent herewith submits the following brief in
opposition to the pending appeal to the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah from orders entered by the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, the Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding.

Peter W. Guyon of
GUYON & HUNTER
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
1000 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-5555

Richard B. McKeown of
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
505 East 200 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 3 63-5511

T A B L E

0 F

C 0 N T E N T S

page
- A- -r-Ff ~ \

TABLE
F;:. '

H

f

..

•;-GUMENr"
I.
IT

1
. . . -

• THE r-T-r—

- ;

. . . . "

T H E T R I A L COURT'S FINDING A N D ORDER THA T
APPELLANT A N D RESPONDENT WERE N O T ~ — T
N E R S W E R E CORRECT
A.

B.

B

c

2

3

J u d g e Sawaya's Finding Concerning
t h e Partnership Issue w a s Entirely
A d e q u a t e in Light of t h e Limited
E v i d e n c e Before t h e Coin: t:

3

Appellant Failed to Produce at Trial .
Adequate Evidence to Support the
Existence of a Partnership Between
the Parties
,
,

4

III. THE TRIAL.JUDGE APPROPRIATELY REFUSED "f"t»
MODIFY THE PARTIES1 DECREE OF DIVORCE
A.

2

Judge Sawa^ a l s Rulii ig w as Suppor ted
by Adeqi late Findi i lgs
,

9
9

N o R e l e v a n t Evidence t o Support
A p p e l l a n t ' s Claim of Changed Circumstances W a s Presented t o t h e Trial
Judge
.

' 10.

Principles of Compromise Should
Apply So As To Deny Modification
In This Case,
. .

12

Principles of Contract Cc
and Equity Supported Deni,
Applellant's Request for
Mod if icaticr.

14

iction
f
.

Uncertain c-.: ambiguous provisions should be construed
.iijdinst 4""*" drafter.
, . .

1.4

2.

As between the two parties to
the agreement, Appellant should
bear the loss

15

Modification of a property settlement contract should not be
permitted for unilateral mistake

15

Appellant was guilty of unclean
hands in connection with this
lawsuit

16

JUDGE SAWAYA CORRECTLY DECLINED TO MODIFY
APPELLANT'S PROPERTY SETTLEMENT DECREE ON
THE BASIS OF ADVERSE TAX CONSEQUENCES. .

18

APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS
PROPERLY DENIED

21

3.

4.

IV.

V,

24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Dotv v. Town of Cedar Hills. 656 P.2d 993 (Utah 1982)

23

Foulaer v. Foulaer. 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981)

10

Hanlon v. Melfi. 423 N.Y.S. 2d 132 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979)
Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976)
Johanson Brothers Builders v. Board of Review. Ind. Comm.
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978)
Kimball v. McCornick. 259 P. 313 (Utah 1927)
Klopenstine v. Havs. 57 P. 712 (Utah 1899)
Koesling v. Basamakis. 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975)
Kulchar v. Kulchar. 462 P. 2d 17 (Cal 1969)

7
17
9
10
9
23
9
19, 20

Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank. 673 P. 2d 590 (Utah 1983)

4

Pearson v. Pearson.. 561 P. 2d 1080 (Utah 1977)

4

Re Marriage of Hall. 681 P. 2d 543 (Colo. App. 1984)

16

Seal v. Tavco, Inc., 400 P.2d 503 (Utah 1965)

15

Twiggs v. The State Board of Land C'rs, 75 P. 729
(Utah 1904)
Wright v. Union Pac. R. Co.. 62 P. 317 (Utah 1902)

15
21

OTHER AUTHORITIES
American Jurisprudence 2d Volume 4, Appeal and Error,
Section 250

14

American Jurisprudence 2d Volume 4, Appeal and Error
Section 409

2

American Jurisprudence 2d Volume 15, Compromise and
Settlement, Section 5
ii

13

American Jurisprudence 2d Volume 27, Equity,
Section 146

15

American Jurisprudence 2d Volume 59, Partnership,
Section 80

7

American Jurisprudence 2d Volume 59, Partnership
Section 50

8

American Jurisprudence 2d Volume 59, Partnership
Section 55

8

Corbin on Contracts, Section 559

15

Restatement of Contracts, Second, Section 151c

16

Restatement of Contracts, Second, Section 406

14

Summary of Utah Family Law, Journal of Legal Studies
B.Y.U., Section 12.18
Summary of Utah Family Law, Journal of Legal Studies

11

B.Y.U., Section 25.3

17

Utah Code Annotated, 48-1-4(4)

8

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 4b

2,3

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a)

21

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(a)

3

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 58(A) (c)

2

iii

RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent Celia Tipton raises jurisdictional, equitable,
and legal objections to this appeal. Jurisdictionally, the
present appeal is untimely.

Equitably, a variety of doctrines

and principles should operate so as to deny Appellant any relief
whatsoever.

Legally, abundant authority supports repeated

decisions, in Respondent's favor, by the Court Commissioner,
Sandra Peuler, and the trial judge, the Honorable James
S. Sawaya.
Respondent denies many of the statements of fact made in
Appellant's brief without any reference to the record on appeal
("R.") or the reporter's transcript ("R.T.") of hearings before
Judge Sawaya.

Even though limitations of time and length

preclude Respondent from listing, and disproving, each and every
assertion of fact from Appellant's Brief which is not supported
in the record, Respondent's failure to specifically deny one or
more such "statements of fact" should not be interpreted as
agreement to the same.
A related problem is the fault of both parties, and hinders
the ability of this Court to conduct an effective review.

As

reflected from the very beginning of the reporter's transcript
(See, R.T. p.3, lines 10-18 and R.T. p.4, lines 6-7), packages of
documentary evidence, lists of issues, and other materials were
submitted to Judge Sawaya at the April 5, 1985 "trial" in this
matter.

All the "evidence" upon which Judge Sawaya ruled

consisted of proffered testimony and documentary evidence—almost

none of which is found in the record before this Court.

The

packages of materials prepared, and used by both parties at the
April 5, 1985 "trial", were never included as part of the
official clerk's record.

Respondent feels herself powerless to

remedy the defect at this point and refuses to shoulder a burden
which is properly placed upon the Appellant.

(See e.g., 4

Am. Jur. 2d "Appeal and Error", Section 409, p.87.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE PRESENT APPEAL IS UNTIMELY
In considering the jurisdiction of this Court to hear Monte
Tipton's Appeal, the Addendum contains an abbreviated chronology
of events and orders to show that the appeal is untimely.
The events from May 9, 1985 are particularly significant.
Both the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Order
relating to the same, which are the principle subject of this
Appeal, were entered by Judge Sawaya on May 9, 1985.

Appellant's

May 20 Motion for New Trial, etc. tolled the time for appeal from
Judge Sawaya's Order, Findings and Conclusions (U.R.A.P. 4b).
Following a hearing before Judge Sawaya on the Motion for
New Trial, etc. (R.T. 51-60), Judge Sawaya executed and entered
his Order denying Appellant's various motions.

That Order

(R. 13 6) was entered by the court clerk in the docket sheet on
September 23, 1985 and mailed to all counsel.

It contained no

directions for any party to prepare another order for the court,
nor were findings and conclusions necessary.

As recognized in

U.R.C.P. 58 A(c) "A judgment is complete and shall be deemed
2

entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real
property, when the same is signed and filed as herein provided."
As Rule 54 (a) notes, the term "'judgment1... includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies."

Entry of Judge

Sawaya's order on 9-23-85 commenced the running of Monte Tipton's
time to appeal

(U.R.A.P. 4b:

"The time for appeal for all

parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial
or granting or denying any such other motion.").
Appellant himself recognized the appealability of Judge
Sawaya's September 23, 1985 order in his first Notice of Appeal
(R. 144) filed months later--on 4-19-86.

By that time,

Appellant's right to appeal had already expired (U.R.A.P. 4).
Respondent's filing of a redundant and duplicative Order on
5-2 0-8 6 (R. 149) did not serve to extend the time to appeal.
As recognized in Larsen v. Larsen 657 P. 2d 1350, 1351 (Utah
1983), a case involving duplicative, and redundant, judgments,
the time for appeal runs from the first judgment or order.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING AND ORDER THAT APPELLANT AND
RESPONDENT WERE NOT PARTNERS WERE CORRECT
A.

Judge Sawaya's Finding Concerning the Partnership Issue

was Entirely Adequate in Light of the Limited Evidence Before the
Court.
Given the absence of affirmative evidence by Appellant, the
trial court's finding concerning partnership should stand.

The

effective limits upon a trial judge's findings or conclusions are
3

well known.

Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 673 P. 2d 590, 601

(Utah 1983), noted:
Upon reviewing the pleadings, the evidence and the
findings of fact in this matter, we conclude that,
although the findings with respect to the issues
delineated under this particular point are not as full
and complete as might be desired, they do ascertain the
ultimate facts and sufficiently conform to the pleadings and the evidence supporting the judgment...
* * * *

Substantial compliance with Rule 52(a) does not,
however, require that the trial court negative every
allegation contained in the pleadings; rather the Rule
is satisfied if, from the finding it [the trial court]
makes, there can be no reasonable inference other than
that it must have found against such allegations.
Of equal import is the decision of Pearson v. Pearson 561
P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977):
Findings of fact and conclusions of law will support a
judgment, though they are very general, where they in
most respects follow the allegation of the pleadings.
Findings should be limited to the ultimate facts and if
they ascertain ultimate facts, and sufficiently conform
to the pleadings and the evidence to support the
judgement, they will be regarded as sufficient, though
not as full and complete as might be desired.
B.

Appellant Failed to Produce at Trial Adequate Evidence

to Support the Existence of a Partnership Between the Parties.
At the "trial11 of this matter, Appellant's evidence that a
partnership existed between himself and Respondent consisted of
the following proffer by Appellantfs counsel before Judge Sawaya
(R.T. p.23 Line 9-22):
Now, the issue of partnership shares has been brought
up. I refer to Mr. McKeown's schematic drawing of the
Wine Cup Ranch partnership which we do not agree with.
In the first place, I am led to believe in the Wine Cup
Ranch partnership—I don't have any documents either,
your Honor, but I don't think there necessarily have to
4

be documents. I think that Plaintiff is, if nothing
else, she is a de facto general partner by virtue of
the fact that not only did she enter into the stipulation and settlement agreement accepting a fifty-percent
partnership share, but also by accepting and filing-that was given to her there with a K-l form which is
to be filed by partners in the partnership. She did,
it is my understanding, filed those K-l forms out of
the distributed share from the fall of 1981 or previously.
Respondent's proof of the non-existence of a fact was
necessarily limited.

In the first place, Respondent's counsel

proffered her denial that she was a partner or that a partnership
existed, and further denied possession of any documentation, pro
or con, on the subject

(R.T. p.17 Lines 8-22).

Respondent

further denied any intentional action which would make her a
partner.

(R.T. p. 26, Line 22, p. 27, Line 12):

The concept of the de facto general partnership is one
that is difficult for me to handle. A partnership
requires acquiescence by partners. It is not something
that occurs spontaneously. It is not something that
occurs by order of the Court. What the Court has to
deal with is property distribution. I don't think that
by implication or otherwise the Court can require that
Celia become a general partner in a property or in any
partnership of any kind. It's her impression that she
never signed a partnership agreement. I think that is
refuted but nothing has been produced to indicate that
she did. It is our position that she is not in fact a
partner, in fact, upon receipt of a K-l for 1983, the
first tax year, she received a K-l. She indicated that
she felt she was not a partner and subsequent to that
we have written a letter to the other general partner,
Darrell Christensen, indicating we do not believe she
is a partner. To date, she has not received a K-l for
the 1984 tax year.
Judge Sawaya, faced with a totally inadequate showing by
Appellant,

gave the partnership "issue" all the attention it

deserved in his findings and conclusions.

Just as Appellant now

places this Court in the impractical position of attempting to
5

review issues without a complete record, the Appellant placed
Judge Sawaya in the position of resolving issues upon which no
affirmative evidence could be found.
In considering the lack of evidence to support Appellant's
claim that a partnership existed, the practical effect of this
issue should be kept in mind.

As reflected in the abbreviated

chronology (Addendum), Appellant, through his counsel, prepared
and executed a stipulation containing the very property distribution provisions of which he now complains.
Presumably, Appellant drafted his proposed contract with
Respondent in such a fashion as to obtain every reasonable
advantage.

As discussed in Part III B below, Respondent consid-

ered the tax consequences of the proposed stipulation with her
counsel and her accountant.

Appellant's disregard of potential

tax consequences, entirely in keeping with his past history of
controversy with the Internal Revenue Service, led to his
discovery that the agreement which he drafted and requested
Respondent to execute bore unfavorable tax consequences.

Facing

the very loss which Judge Sawaya found Appellant could have
avoided

(R. 16, Finding 2 ) , Appellant pressed the inventive

argument that the effect of the property settlement provisions
was to make Respondent a partner with the Appellant.

In consid-

ering the existence of a partnership between the parties, the
absence of a presumption in favor of such a finding, and the
burden of proof upon the Appellant, is clear:
The existence of a partnership will not be presumed,
but must be proved... In accord with the general
6

principle that the burden of proof to establish the
affirmative of an issue involved in an action rests
upon the party alleging the facts constituting that
issue, the burden of proving the existence of a
partnership is ordinarily on him who alleges and relies
on the fact of its existence and this rule applies to
one who alleges a partnership by estoppel as well as to
one who attempts to establish a partnership as between
the parties to the action. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, "Partnership", Section 80, p. 993-994.
In this regard, the lack of any written partnership agreement or other documentary evidence initiated by the Respondent
is significant.

The New York Supreme Court ruled in Hanlon

v. Melfi. 423 N.Y.S. 2d 132, 134 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1979):
A partnership is an association of two or more persons
to place their money, efforts, labor or skill, or some
or all of these in lawful commerce for business and to
divide the profits and bear the loss in certain
proportions (citation omitted). The fact that there is
no written agreement of partnership is not conclusive
in determining whether or not a partnership exists but
it is an element to be taken into serious consideration
in determining where the thrust of the controversy is.
Where no partnership agreement is executed in writing
by the parties, it must be determined from the testimony, from the conduct of the parties, and especially
from the documentary evidence, whether or not a
partnership existed. The burden, of course, of
establishing the existence of an oral partnership by a
fair preponderance of the credible evidence rests upon
the party claiming the partnership (citation omitted).
It has further been held that an indispensable requirement of a partnership is a mutual promise or understanding of the parties to share in the profits of the
business and submit to the burden of making good the
losses. (citations omitted).
Appellant's bald assertion that a property settlement
provision creates a partnership between himself and his former
strains credulity.

What "efforts, labor or skill" were to

be contributed to this partnership by the Respondent?

The

property settlement provision in question speaks of a distribu7

tion of monies to be generated from a note, but what about a
distribution of losses?

What is the venture that this supposed

partnership is engaged in?

The only evidence before Judge Sawaya

was that the proceeds of a particular fund were to be divided
according to a set formula.

The division of monies owed under a

note does not constitute "a share of the proceeds of a business11
as defined by Section 48-1-4(4), Utah Code Annotated.
The Uniform Partnership Act provides that the receipt
by a person of a share of the profits of a business is
prima facie evidence that he is a partner of the
business, unless such profits were received in payment
of a debt...
The Uniform Partnership Act formulation is in accord
with earlier law, and it is undisputed that participation in profits is prima facie evidence that the person
receiving a share of the profits is a partner. But the
presumption of partnership arising from a participation
of profits may be rebutted, and outweighed by other
evidence or circumstance. The presumption has been
said to operate only in the absence of invalidating
evidence, and to evaporate in the face of 'substantial
evidence.1 59 Am. Jur. 2d, "Partnership", Section 50
p.970.
Still additional critical elements are missing from
Appellant's claim of partnership.

For example, there was no

evidence before Judge Sawaya as to the power or control which
Respondent could exercise.
The degree to which a creditor may control the business
of his Debtor may be the determining factor in deciding
whether a partnership exists. When a creditor exercises no more control than is required for the protection of a loan, no partnership will generally be held
to exist. Id, Section 55, p. 970.
Respondent respectfully submits the trial court's conclusion
was inescapable.

Since the parties' joint involvement was

limited to a single transaction, the payment of a debt through
8

division of proceeds from a note, not an on-going business
venture (Cf. Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah
1975),

since Celia Tipton contributed neither property nor

services (Cf. Kimball v. McCornick, 259 P. 313, 314 (Utah 1927),
and since there was no meeting of the minds on a business, orally
or in writing,

(Cf. Johanson Brothers Builders v. Board of

Review, Industrial Commission, P.2d 563, 567 (Utah 1950), Judge
Sawaya appropriately rejected Appellant's partnership claim as an
afterthought induced by his continued difficulty with the IRS.
Appellant's claims of "estoppel" (See Appellant's Brief,
p. 19) and of detrimental reliance upon acts or representations
by the Respondent, is without any support in either the reporter's transcript or any other portion of the record.

For this

reason, Respondent respectfully requests that this court ignore
all assertions for claims which the Appellant cannot support with
appropriate references to the record.
III.
THE TRIAL JUDGE APPROPRIATE REFUSED TO MODIFY THE PARTIES' DECREE
OF DIVORCE

A.

Judcre Sawaya's Ruling was Supported by Adequate

Findings.
With respect to the issue of written findings,

the

Respondent hereby incorporates by reference its previous discussion found in Part II A.

Again, the sparsity of the t r i a l

court's findings was effectively mandated by Appellant's own
i n a b i l i t y to present evidence in support of his position.
9

B.

No Relevant Evidence to Support Appellant's Claim of

Changed Circumstances Was Presented to the Trial Judge,
Preliminarily, the standard applicable to a showing a
changed circumstances with respect to property settlements,
especially those involving real property, was stated in Foulcrer
v, Foulqer, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981):
The change in circumstance required to justify a
modification of the Decree of Divorce varies with the
type of modification contemplated... Where a disposition of real property is in question however, the court
should properly be more reluctant to grant a modification.
In the interest of securing stability of
titles, modifications in a decree of divorce, making
distribution of real property, are to be granted only
upon a showing of compelling reasons arising from a
substantial and material change of circumstances.
The above holds true a fortiori where the property
disposition is the product of an agreement and stipulation between the parties, and sanctioned by the trial
court. Such a provision is the product of an agreement
bargained for by the parties. As such, a trial court
should subsequently modify such a provision only with
great reluctance, and based upon compelling reason.
Absent such substantial change, the decree cannot be collaterally
attacked due to the doctrine of res judicata.

Kessimakis

v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978).
A review of the proffered testimony before Judge Sawaya at
the April 5, 1985 "trial" disproves Appellant's claim that his
tax liability could not have been know or even guessed at.
Parenthetically, it should be observed the Respondent engaged
her own tax expert to advise her as to the tax consequences of
the proposed property settlement stipulation (R.T. p. 13, lines
14-19.)

In addition, well known Utah authorities have spoken of

the need to consider the tax consequences of marital property
10

settlements for some time.

The following excerpt from the

Summary of Utah Family Law, Journal of Legal Studies, (1980)
B.Y.U., Section 12.18, p. 311, is illustrative:
The tax consequences of the property settlement need to
be analyzed carefully. Alimony is often taxable to
recipient and deductible to the payor. Division of
the marital estate may give rise to a tax liability
because of the liquidation of the assets. In some
situations, transfer of assets between spouses upon
divorce may trigger a taxable event. An award of real
property will normally include a corresponding property
tax obligation.
Appellant's failure to consider these matters is rendered
even more inexcusable in light of his admitted history of
controversy with the Internal Revenue Service.

At the trial,

Appellant admitted disputes with the IRS years before Appellant
proposed the property settlement agreement which he now would
like to re-write:
Now, there is another circumstance that Mr. Tipton
would testify, to, and that is that he had previous
problems with the Internal Revenue Service because of
the nature of his business and I will try to give the
Court an outline a little later on if I can. Right now
let me state that in 1980 Mr. Tipton settled with the
Internal Revenue Service a $271,000 claim they had
against him for $162,000... (R.T. p. 20, lines 7-14).
Immediately before this, Appellant's counsel proffered Monte
Tipton's testimony concerning the certified public accountants
who he had been working with since 1982.

(R.T. p.19, Lines 8-23.

Although, at the time of trial, Appellant claimed that the
medical problems of one of his accountants delayed preparation of
his tax return preparations, there was no proffer of testimony
that Mr. Tipton was unable to find another competent accountant,

11

or was otherwise prevented from attending to his tax obligations.
Appellant's proffered testimony was that at the time that he
proposed the property settlement agreement to Celia Tipton, he
was aware of tax consequences, generally, and believed that he
was taking care of them:
But in any event, during 1978 through 1982, he (Monte
Tipton) continued to accrue certain tax liabilities
which he in his own mind felt he was taking care of by
i n v e s t m e n t tax c r e d i t s and other v e h i c l e s .
(R.T. p. 21, lines 2-5.)
C.

Principles of Compromise Should Apply So As To Deny

Modification in This Case.
The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement prepared by
Appellant's counsel

(R. 7-14.) included provisions concerning

property settlement that, according to paragraph 9 thereof, were
intended to be "complete and final."

In paragraph 11 thereof,

both parties declared:
It is understood and agreed to by the parties hereto
that this agreement constitutes a complete, fair and
equitable settlement of any claims the Plaintiff Celia
Sherwood Tipton has or may have against any and all
property, whether the same be real or personal, owned
by Defendant Monte D. Tipton or which Defendant Monte
D. Tipton may have an interest...
The provisions of paragraphs 13 and 14, cited below,
highlighted the fact that both parties understood that they were
agreeing to compromise all claims that they might have had
against the other:
It is understood by both parties that Plaintiff's
claims against all property, real or personal, owed by
Defendant, prior to, during, or subsequent to the
parties' marriage, are disputed and that the instant
12

agreement is entered into for the purpose of settling
all such dispute claims...
Both parties enter this agreement of their own free
will and choice, and assert that they do so willingly
and that they are fully aware of the ramifications of
this agreement...
Through careful draftsmanship of that agreement, Appellant
protected himself against any subsequent claims by the Respondent
to his real or personal assets. Respondent was precluded, by the
agreement, from asserting that she did not understanding the
ramifications of the settlement.

Respondent was prevented from

asserting that she did not know the nature or extent of
Appellant's assets. Respondent was required to certify that she
was not under any form of adverse influence.

Now, facing the

consequences of his own negligence and failure to prepare against
the tax consequences of the exact agreement which he drafted, the
Appellant desires to re-write the contract.

Under Hornbook

principles relating to the public policy behind settlement
agreements, and their effect, Appellant's request should be
denied.
The law favors the resolution of controversies and
uncertainties through compromise and settlement rather
than through litigation, and it is the policy of the
law to uphold and enforce such contracts if they are
fairly made and are not in contradiction of some law or
public policy. Am. Jur. 2d, "Compromise and Settlement", Section 5, p. 777.
Once the parties have entered into an agreement
settling a disputed claim, neither party will, in the
absence of any element of fraud or bad faith, be
permitted to repudiate it. Id, Section 7, p.779.
Indeed, a principle related to the concept of compromise and
settlement provides that the acceptance of the benefits of a
13

decree precludes a party from appealing the same:
A party who accepts an award or legal advantage under
an order, judgment or decree, ordinarily waives his
right to any such review of the adjudication as may
again put in issue his right to the benefit which he
has accepted. This is so even though the judgment,
decree or order may have been generally unfavorable to
the Appellant. Whether a party who accepted benefits
under a judgment actually intended to waive his right
to appeal is, as a general rule, immaterial. 4
Am. Jur. 2d, "Appeal and Error,"
Section 250,
pp. 745-746.
Appellant's tardy discovery that he had miscalculated his
tax obligations is no reason to excuse him from his own agreement.
D.

Principles of Contract Construction and Equity Support-

ed Denial of Appellant's Request for Modification.
1.

Uncertain or ambiguous provisions should be construed

against the drafter.
The settlement agreement incorporated in the Decree of
Divorce provided that Respondent should receive "a fifty per cent
(50%) partnership share of the balance due to the parties hereto
from the Sierra Pacific note..."

(R. 11, p. 4, paragraph 9 (c).

paragraph 9 (c). Any ambiguity should be construed against
Appellant as the drafter of the Agreement.

The rule and rational

is well explained in the Restatement of Contracts, Second,
Section 206:
In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise
or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is
generally preferred which operates against the party
who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise
proceeds. Comment: a. Rationale. Where one party
chooses the terms of a contract, he is likely to
provide more carefully for the protection of his own
interests than for those of the other party. He is
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also more likely than the other party to have reason to
know of uncertainties of meaning. Indeed, he may leave
meaning deliberately obscure, intending to decide at a
later date what meaning to assert. In cases of doubt,
therefore, so long as other factors are not decisive,
there is substantial reason for preferring the meaning
of the other party.
This rule, sometimes referred to as interpretation "contra
proferentem", was noted by this Court in Seal v. Tayco, Inc.,
400 P. 2d 503, 505 (Utah 1965).
Section 559,
2.

See also, Corbin on Contracts,

p. 262 (West 1960).

As between the two parties to the agreement, Appellant

should bear the loss
It is an equitable principle that where litigants
assert conflicting claims, and hence, loss or prejudice
must be born by one of them, the decision in the event
t h a t t h e y are s h o w n to h a v e b e e n e q u a l l y
•innocent 1 —that is, ignorant of the harmful consequences of their acts—must be rendered against the
party whose conduct brought about the prejudicial
situation. In this respect it is frequently said that
where one of two innocent parties must suffer, he
through his agency the loss occurred must bear it.
Similarly, it is often said that where one of two
parties, both guiltless of intentional wrong, must
suffer a loss, the one whose conduct, act, or omission
occasions the loss, must stand the consequences. 27
Am. Jur. 2d "Equity", Section 146, pp. 682-683.
This doctrine was adopted long ago by this Court in such
cases as Twiggs v. The State Board of Land C'rs, 75 P. 729 (Utah
1904) .
3.

Modification of a property settlement contract should

not be permitted for unilateral mistake.
At no time has Respondent asserted that she was operating
under a mistake of fact as to the settlement agreement, or the
tax consequences thereto.

Rather, as Judge Sawaya learned,
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(R.T. 13, lines 14-19), Respondent commissioned a tax expert to
advise her, in advance, of the tax consequences she would face
from the proposed property settlement.
Recently, a Colorado appellate court was called upon to
decide whether a United States Tax Court determination adverse to
the husband with respect to the payment of maintenance was
sufficient grounds to modify a maintenance and property settlement

agreement.

(Colo. App. 1984).

Re

Marriage

of H a l l .

681 P.

2d

543

After considering rules relating to the

interpretation of contracts, as well as the existence of a valid
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integration clause" (substantially identical with the one

drafted by the Appellant R. 14, Par. 25) the Colorado Court ruled
as follows:
Where no question of fraud, bad faith or inequitable
conduct is involved, and the claim of a right to reform
a contract is [based] solely on a mistake, it is
absolutely necessary that the mistake be mutual, and
that both parties understood the contract to be
different from what it shows on its face, and that the
interest of the contract would have been different
except for a mistake. (citation omitted). A party's
prediction or judgment as to events to occur in the
future, even if erroneous, is not a 'mistake1 for the
purpose of making a contract voidable. Restatement
Second of Contracts, Section 151c.
4.

Appellant was guilty of unclean hands in connection

with this lawsuit
A serious matter raised by Respondent in the trial before
Judge Sawaya on April 5, 1985 involved the forgery of the
Respondent's signature on a 1979 federal income tax return
prepared and filed by Appellant in 1982.

Respondent proffered

her personal denial that she signed the tax return in question as
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well as the documentary and expert testimony of Robert F. Grubby,
a questioned documents examiner.

Although the detarls of

Mr. Grubbyfs qualifications and analysis constitute a small part
of the numerous papers not before this court, as discussed above,
clear evidence of a forgery was proffered.

(R.T. p. 12, line 12

to p. 13, line 13) and R.T. p. 26, lines 5-19)
The forgery of Respondent's signature to a joint tax return
was a fraudulent act resorted to by Appellant in a desperate
attempt to minimize his tax liability.

Appellant had no right to

sign her name without consent.
To qualify for the filing of a joint income tax return,
tax payers must meet statutory requirements as established in I.R.C. Section 6013. The first of those
requirements is that the tax payers must be married.
The second is that they make the election to file
jointly. Summary of Utah Family Law, Supra, Section
25.3 p. 649.
As previously indicated, Respondent repeatedly denied signing
the return for 1979 taxes and had filed separate tax returns for
the period in question (R.T. p.13, lines 11-13.).
Appellant has sought relief from both the trial court, and
of this Court, on the basis of equity.

Where an Appellant

is guilty of unclean hands, he has disqualified himself from any
such relief.
It is inherent in the nature and purpose of equity that
it will grant relief only when fairness and good
conscience so demand. Correlated to this is the
precept that equity does not reward one who has engaged
in fraud or deceit in the business under consideration,
but reserves its rewards for those who are themselves
acting in fairness and good conscience, or as is
sometimes said, to those who have come into Court with
clean hands. Jacobson v. Jacobson 557 P. 2d 156, 158
(Utah 1976).
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The conduct of which Respondent complains is closely related
to the very transaction and form of relief at issue.

Appellant

claims that he is entitled to a modification of his own property
settlement agreement on the grounds that the tax consequences
thereof
forged
and

are operating to his disadvantage.
Respondent's

signature, and having

However, having
advanced

fraudulent tax return to the Internal Revenue

a

false

Service,

Appellant should be denied relief.
IV.
JUDGE SAWAYA CORRECTLY DECLINED TO MODIFY APPELLANT'S
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT DECREE ON THE BASIS OF ADVERSE TAX
CONSEQUENCES
Relevant

provisions

of the divorce decree

include

the

following:
(a)

Appellant Monte Tipton was ordered to assume and pay

all his own obligations and debts since separation.

(R. 27,

p. 1 1 ) ;
(b)

Appellant Monte Tipton was ordered to pay all joint

debts "prior to May 1, 1982, which are not specified herein
and shall hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom.11 (R. 27, p. 1 2 ) ;
(c)

All other claims whether known or unknown were expres-

sly deemed waived by each party against the other. (R. 27-28
par. 13).
In connection with the express waiver provisions

noted

above, Respondent's counsel included, as part of the package of
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material presented to the trial judge, a letter from Appellant's
counsel described in the Reporter's Transcript (p. 11, lines
8-15) as follows:
...I have enclosed a letter which I received from
Mr. Guyon on February 17. It was sent on February 17
which specifically requests the language indicating
that all claims of any nature whatsoever that either
may have are deemed waived, and consequently, I would
indicate that I responded by including that and that at
that point in time Mr. Guyon approved the decree and we
submitted it to the Court.
Additional evidence, concerning the parties' intent, never
contradicted in any fashion at the trial, is found with respect
to paragraph 2 3 of the "Stipulation and Settlement Agreement"
prepared by Appellant's counsel.

(R. 13-14, par. 23).

That paragraph says that the parties warned that they
have not incurred any debt or made any commitment for
which the other party or his or her estate may be
liable other than those debts or commitments heretofore
disclosed. It was the intent of the parties, I would
indicate, that all debts were disclosed and that
Mr. Tipton was. to have assumed liability for all joint
debts. (R.T. p. 11, line 21 to p. 12, line 3).
Although Respondent is not aware of any Utah decisions which
even approximate the case before this Court, Mr. Justice Traynor
of the California Supreme Court authored a carefully reasoned
examination of the issue of modification of a property settlement
decree on the basis of subsequently discovered tax liability.
In Kulchar v. Kulchar 462 P. 2d 17, 20 (Cal 1969), Mr. Justice
Traynor considered what kinds of mistake justify modification of
property settlements:
Moreover, a mutual mistake that might be sufficient to
set aside a contract is not sufficient to set aside a
final judgment. The principles of res judicata demand
that the parties present their entire case in one
19

proceeding. 'Public policy requires that pressure be
brought upon litigants to use great care in preparing
cases for trial and in ascertaining all the facts. A
rule which would permit the re-opening of cases
previously decided because of error or ignorance during
the progress of the trial would in a large measure
vitiate the effects of the rules of res judicata. f
(Rest. , Judgments, Section 12 6, com. a ) . Courts deny
relief, therefore, when the fraud or mistake is
•intrinsic1; that is, when it 'goes to the merits of
the prior proceedings, which should have been guarded
against by the Plaintiff at that time. » (Citations
omitted.)
Significantly, in Kulchar., both parties agreed that a
mistake had been made as to the tax consequences of their
property settlement agreement.

In our case, however, Respondent

has repeatedly denied that any mistake occurred.

How much more

applicable, in our case, are the words of Mr. Justice Traynor in
Kulchar, supra, at 21:

"Relief is also denied when the complain-

ing party has contributed to the fraud or mistake, giving rise to
the judgment thus obtained."

Noting that data concerning tax

considerations existed at the time of trial, the California
Supreme Court reversed a trial court order modifying the divorce
decree so as to relieve the Defendant husband of liability to pay
federal income taxes:
In the present case both parties knew of the New
Zealand assets, but the husband and his attorney chose
not to investigate their taxability. The property
settlement agreement expressly covered unknown tax
liability. Having had full opportunity to consider all
income of the wife and its concurrent tax consequences,
the husband cannot now complain of the added tax
burden. (Kulchar, supra. at 22.)
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V.
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS PROPERLY DENIED
The final major argument of Monte Tipton's appeal is the
alleged reversible error committed by Judge Sawaya in his denial
of Appellant's Motion for New Trial, etc.

The first matter

raised by Appellant with respect to the Motion for New Trial was
that the Court's ruling, without findings, constituted a violation of Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
merits little attention.

This argument

A motion for a new trial is not a trial

on the merits requiring findings and conclusions.

Indeed, as

this Court recognized in Wright v. Union Pac. R. Co. , 62 P. 317
(Utah 1902), findings on a Motion for New Trial are neither
necessary nor usual.
The basis for the Motion for New Trial was stated in the
Motion itself

(R.123) as "irregularity in the proceedings"

(par. 1 ) , specifically, "intentional misrepresentations" by
the Plaintiff Celia Tipton (R. 124, Par. 2 ) , and the discovery of
previously unknown evidence (R.124, Par. 3 ) . At the hearing
before Judge Sawaya, Appellant's counsel placed great emphasis
upon the "Acknowledgement of Obligation to Pay Tax" (R. 130)
signed by Respondent Celia Sherwood Tipton:
That's why we are asking for a new trial. We feel that
this acknowledgement of tax liability was specifically
kept from us. We had no way of finding this information and it was not brought to the Court's attention by
Plaintiff, of course, because it would have hurt her
case at the time. (R.T. P. 53, lines 10-15).
Notwithstanding this serious assertion, careful examination
of the record contradicts Appellant's claims that (1) Celia
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Tipton concealed the document, and (2) the document was not
available to Monte Tipton upon an exercise of due diligence.
Speaking for both himself and his client, Respondent's attorneyrepresented to the trial judge that neither he nor his client
concealed the document.
Again, this document was apparently available at the
time of the hearing but was not found by anybody. We
were unaware of it. We see it for the first time as a
part of this motion. Again, Mrs. Sherwood (Tipton)
does recognize that she signed the document at the time
that she made the first distribution. I think it is
consistent, entirely consistent with the testimony that
was proffered at trial in terms of her partnership
interest and the fact that she was not a partner.
(R.T. p. 57, lines 3-11).
Respondent's explanation of the document, paragraph by paragraph,
(R.T. p. 56, line 1 to p. 57, line 3) was apparently full and
complete to the trial judge.
Following such testimony, counsel for the Appellant again
addressed the issue, but provided no evidence in support of the
claim that the document in question could not have been discovered, or that said document had been intentionally withheld by his
opponent or the opposing client.

Again, this is yet another

situation where an assertion of fact is made without any basis
for support in the record.
of documents.

There is no evidence of concealment

There is no testimony by Appellant of the efforts

which he made, prior to "trial", to discover the document in
question.

There is no evidence as to the fashion in which the

document was eventually discovered.

There is no evidence of

the circumstances under which the document was found.

The

document itself is dated weeks before the trial and a month
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before the motion for a new trial.

Under these circumstances,

the grievous, yet unsupported, assertion of impropriety by
Respondent is unmerited.
This Court has repeated the elements of proof necessary to
support a motion for new trial on the grounds of newly discovered
evidence since the last century.

In Klopenstine v. Hays, 57

P. 712, 714 (Utah 1899) these principles were detailed:
It is well settled that, to entitle a defeated party
to a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered
evidence, it must appear (1) that he used reasonable
diligence to discover and produce at the former trial
the newly-discovered evidence, and that his failure to
do so was not the result of his own negligence; (2)
that the newly-discovered evidence is not simply
cumulative; (3) that such evidence is not sufficient if
it simply be to impeach an adverse witness. (4) It
must be material to the issues, and so important as to
satisfy the Court, by reasonable inference, that the
verdict or judgment would have been different if the
newly-discovered evidence had been introduced on the
former trial; (5) that the defeated party had no
opportunity to make the defense, or was prevented from
doing so by unavoidable accident, or the fraud or
improper conduct of the other party, without fault on
his part. (Citations omitted).
This Court has consistently followed these rules.

See, Doty

v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1982) and cases
cited therein.
It is apparent that the trial judge not only found that
there was no basis to Monte Tipton's claim that he was without
fault in failing to produce this evidence earlier, but also that
the evidence did not support Monte Tipton's case.
The final point urged with respect to Appellant's motion
for a new trial before the trial judge involved an award of
fees and costs for Mrs. Tipton's accountant.
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As noted by

her counsel in the Reporter's Transcript (R.T. p. 59, lines
3-18), the settlement agreement drafted by Appellant provided at
Par. 21 thereof that a party in default of his/her obligations
would be liable for all reasonable expenses including attorney's
fees (R. 13). In light of the fact that the trial court declined
requests by both parties for attorney's fees, and merely awarded
the Respondent a fraction of the significant accounting expenses
she incurred, no abuse of discretion should be found.
CONCLUSION
The essence of this appeal is Appellant Monte Tipton's
inequitable and insupportable attempt to avoid the consequences
of his legal obligation.

Not only has Appellant failed to

provide this Court with competent factual evidence to permit a
review of the trial court's actions, the record on appeal
disproves Appellant's claims of error.

Thus, Respondent's

defenses rise above technicalities, however well merited, as to
the untimeliness of this appeal, or Appellant's unclean hands.
Rather, they go to the heart of the legal and equitable relationships between the parties.

The findings and orders

appealed from were sufficient and accurate in every necessary
respect.

Respondent requests that the appeal be denied in toto.

DATED this

IQ> day of

OOJVAUJO-JL^

/ 1987.

Respectfully submitted,
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE

Righard B. McKeqwn
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four copies of the above and foregoing
w^r^y hand delivered by United States mail, postage prepaid, this
day of
A^iu>>*^
, 1987 to the following:
Peter W. Guyon
GUYON & HUNTER .
Attorneys at Law
1000 Newhouse Building
10 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

ABBREVIATED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND PLEADINGS

DATE

EVENT/PLEADING

REFERENCE

10-29-78

Celia Sherwood Tipton, now known as Celia
Demman, and Monte Dee Tipton married.

Complaint
for Divorce
R.2.

08-06-82

Plaintiff and Respondent herein, Celia
Tipton, filed her Complaint for Divorce.

R. 2-6.

10-22-82

Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, prepared by counsel for Appellant Monte Tipton,
filed for both parties with consent of Celia!s
counsel.

R. 7-14

32-08-83

Minute Entry of Divorce pursuant to Stipulation made by Judge Bryant H. Croft.

R. 15

33-04-83

Findings and Conclusions, drafted by Respondent's Counsel, filed with the Court.

R. 16-22.

D3-04-83

Decree of Divorce signed by Judge Croft.

R. 23-29.

34-04-83

(Right to Appeal Decree of Divorce expires)

(U.R.A.P. 4)

)9-21-84

Respondent Celia Tipton filed her Motion for
Order to Show Cause against Monte Tipton for
failure to comply with the terms of the Decree
of Divorce.

R. 30-31

.0-29-84

Appellant Monte Tipton filed his Verified
Motion to Dismiss; Order to Show Cause: For
Contempt; For Judgment Against Plaintiff:
And For Other Relief.

R. 39-45

•2-22-85

Appellant Monte Tipton filed his Petition to
Modify Decree of Divorce.

R. 49-52

-a-

03-04-85

Following oral argument, Commissioner Sandra
Peuler filed written recommendations as to
all pending motions by all parties. Specifically, the Commissioner found that Appellant
should bear the tax liability which in large
part forms the basis for this appeal.

R. 59-60

04-05-85

Counsel for both parties appeared before Judge
James S. Sawaya and proffered evidence relative
to issues in dispute. The issues to be decided
were agreed upon by stipulation. Documentary
evidence, and lay and expert testimony, proffered, but not presented to the court.

Reporter's
Transcript
of Proceedings pp.
1-50.

34-26-85

Judge Sawaya issued a Memorandum Decision resolving all issues presented to him. Counsel
for Celia Tipton is directed to prepare an Order
for the Court's signature.

R. 110-113

35-09-85

Findings and Conclusions are signed by Judge
Sawaya in support of his Memorandum Decision.

R. 114-118

)5-09-85

Judge Sawaya signed and entered an Order finalizing his Memorandum Decision.

R. 119-122

)5-2 0-85

Counsel for Appellant filed a Motion for New
Trial; to Take Additional Testimony; To Amend
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and
to Amend Judgment. (Time to appeal tolled)

R. 123-130
TJ.R.A.P. 4b

Counsel for both parties appear before Judge
Sawaya to argue Appellant's Rule 59 Motion
for New Trial, etc.

Reporter's
transcript
pp. 51-60

)9-23-85

>9-2 3-85

Judge Sawaya signed and entered an order denying Appellant's Motion for New Trial, etc.
The order was entered by the clerk in the
docket sheet. Copies were mailed by the clerk
*to all counsel on 09-24-85.

R. 136

0-2 3-85

(Right to Appeal Judge Sawaya's Order of
of 09-23-85 expires)

U.R.A.P. 4

4-19-86

Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal from
the Order of Judge Sawaya of 09-23-85.
(Notice untimely).

R. 144

-b-

05-20-86

Counsel for Respondent Celia Tipton filed a
second Order, signed by Judge Sawaya, duplicating the Order of Judge Sawaya of 9-23-85.

R. 149

06-13-86

Appellant filed his Amended Notice of Appeal
from both Judge Sawaya's personally prepared
order of 09-23-85 and the redundant Order prepared by Respondent's Counsel of 05-2 0-8 6.
Notice untimely.

R. 151

-c-

